

N/N

29 Aug

GA is wrong,
Shun's right!

a continuity from
FDR; not a break,
a shift [on CW, yes,
prob -
more, more
emphasis on
helpfulness

2) FDR makes real
decisions; i.e.
firebombing

X

3. USG could
have threatened
an Emperor:

- if we have to
invade Kyushu

(or an - if you
delay decision

The Imperial
system will be
uprooted [we
could change

- Emperor beyond

[Demo: bombs on Imp.
Palace [not on city!]

[Wf was the main
discussant (?) - making
acceptability of - Nicobite
- Imperial
System

contingent on this
behavior, evolution of
war?

(Even if WfB wanted
to keep Exp. - or, both
summar - they could
threaten, bluff. Besides,
Real to keep Exp. after big cas.:/
(Challenger - something)

4. but simply didn't
change any of the
FDR-Churchill policies
[Matter carried. -

on Japan - sure!
by Churchill!
after firebombing?!

(question was
raised earlier than
firebombing on Dresden.

What was Marshall's
attitude on firebombing?
+ he didn't press for mil.
to go out -

(GROVES, ET AL
FDR POLICY OF

a) USING THE BOMB;

b) AS SOON AS READY
IF WAR WAS STILL
GOING ON (E.G. IF SU
DIDN'T COME IN BEFORE
AUG 1 (not in our
control!

(to forestall or limit
SU entry - if not too
late for that)

non-decision because
no opposition to this,

no arguement / cons /
cost consideration
no "reason" to change
it [no further
"mature ^{needed} consideration"]
[esp. after March 9-10!]
Coo Sigmond saw;
the people who did
that would use Bunk;
and on the successors
(Tamm, Byrnes - the
(only) two honest!) would
have no reason not to!

I am if Truman
would not have
approved fire-
bombing!

CAN WE BE SURE
HE WOULD HAVE?!

NOT FROM HIS
APPROVAL OF A-BOMB!

I Could Marshall have
approved invasion, if
we thought there was

a significant
change of 250,000+
KIA — coming to
Mood and all estimates?

I clearly was
against invasion,
for agots — as was
Nasser. Both wanted
to minimize chance
of invasion — but
not in favor of
Bomb! With
advocated — surely they
could have approved, if
asked.

no one said to HST:
without warning,
or offer - don't
attack!

[Extend beyond,
et al]

am Bond ...

"It wasn't necessary"
means (legitimately)

The extending

crisis, that night/could
have justified it did not
exist; not exist, "it

want "cost-
effective, ^{or} optimal,"

H/N

late Aug 95

BB's point that
she, etc. ^{etc will} shall not
~~express reasons~~
advise not to use
Bomb, or reasons
for it

[contrary to impression
then gives — in interest
of stressing "reason"
of CW Atomic Dip

[This may well have
influenced thinking of

Portadown meeting,
and last stands at
Portadown, and, is sent,
rejection of offer
to Emperor before

Aug 9; (along with other
the "various measures
for these decisions

(on which there were
opposed points of
consideration
views, arguments presented,
opposed advice)

BUT NOT THE "NON-DECISION"
NOT TO CHANGE THE

Haber

Look up SCA Marshall
Book on ~~the~~ Strat.
berly — did not
in way, not
"messing"